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Tilting at windmills?
Innovations in information technology can be both positive and negative when
applied to the workplace. On the positive side, there is an extended reach
for individuals in any one country. Borders become less of an obstacle.
However, regulatory frameworks within jurisdictions may remain hardened.
Employment is one regulatory framework in which rigidity is evident.
Ambitions for workplace efficiency precipitate rules that endeavour to remove
(rather than work with), from labour/employment law, the human variable.
Technological innovation in the workplace is explored here as one permutation
of this ambition.
Scientific Management
As presently perceived, algorithms provide all the certainty that numbers
ostensibly offer. Algorithms in the workplace recall the spirit of Frederick
Taylor’s ‘scientific management’ (outlined in his 1919 book The Principles of
Scientific Management), wherein workers required an unusual amount of
cajoling. Algorithms provide the metrics to coax optimal effort. To Taylor’s
chagrin, algorithms are immune from neither critical analysis nor scrutiny.
Engaging with algorithms as potential sources of information, instead of
solutions in themselves, can yield a better understanding of technology in
the workplace. Moreover, further investigation can contribute to anticipating
the nature of future challenges as well as assist in avoiding the
‘transparency fallacy’.
Medium Law
Using communications theory, Daithí Mac Síthigh has asked a question
especially pertinent to the broader legal community: why have certain
distinctions been made in the regulation of particular forms of media? He
points out that there can be curious divisions based on the perception of the
medium under consideration. A message to be derived from the medium of
algorithms is that the workplace is not devoid of social considerations, and
pragmatism in the workplace does not necessarily exclude recognition of those
who populate it.
The GDPR and Algorithms
The General Data Protection Regulation overarches this topic. Within the
GDPR, employers fall under the definition of ‘controller’. The GDPR
contemplates ‘profiling’ algorithms for workplace outputs. Article 22
provides the data subject (here the employee) with a right to avoid a
decision based solely on automated processing that carries a legal effect.
The distinction targeted here is between automated decision support (where a
person makes the final decision) and automated decision-making (where there
is no human judgement involved). Art.22 does not apply, though, where the
decision arrived at by automated processing ‘is necessary for entering into,
or performance of, a contract between the data subject and a data
controller’. The Article 29 Working Party in its Opinion 2/2017 on data
processing at work explained that ‘performance of a contract and legitimate
interests can sometimes be invoked, provided the processing is strictly
necessary for a legitimate purpose and complies with the principles of
proportionality and subsidiarity’.
Frank Hendrickx’ recent contribution to this blog highlighted some recent
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights as it faces the challenges of
IT in the workplace. Here I return to the considerations contained within
those decisions to ask whether, with algorithms, we are not being diverted
from the medium, thereby ignoring the message.
Constant Surveillance
Two matters stand out. First, there appears to be only a loose framework
being developed. Second, there is wide scope for efficiency arguments to be
aligned with algorithmic monitoring. The GDPR and the ECtHR’s decision in
Bărbulescu v Romania prompt further deliberation with regards to consent in
employment contracts. Based upon Art. 7(4), a dispute may arise as to whether
or not the processing is necessary for the performance of the employment
contract. Art. 6(1)(b) of the GDPR reiterates the point. It defines lawful
data processing as that ‘necessary for the performance of a contract to which
the data subject is part’. The employer may legitimately argue there must be
the capacity to determine whether or not workers are adhering to contractual
obligations: for example, are workers adhering to workplace IT security
protocols and/or conducting themselves in a way that does not breach data
protection? These could both be viewed as aspects of the performance of the
employment contract. Bărbulescu suggests that at work monitoring may be
permissible in order to ensure that workers are performing contractual
duties; so long as they have been informed beforehand. If this is to be the
case, it may be wondered whether or not the protections outlined within the
GDPR are attenuated.
The Third Section of the ECtHR returned to the issue of consent in López
Ribalda and Others v Spain. In an effort to cut down upon (if not eliminate)
losses due to theft, a supermarket installed both visible and hidden cameras.
Classifying covert video surveillance of employees as a ‘considerable
intrusion’, the majority of the Court found a violation of Article 8. The
ECHR not only protected individuals ‘against arbitrary interference by the
public authorities’, but it also required the state to take steps to provide
effective respect for private life.
Requiring workers to be merely informed stops short of a more complete
analysis of the act of monitoring itself. The question arises: in what state
are privacy rights at work left?
